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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a model that could be used
by system developers to measure the privacy risk per-
ceived by users when they disclose data into software
systems. We first derive a model to measure the per-
ceived privacy risk based on existing knowledge and
then we test our model through a survey with 151 par-
ticipants. Our findings revealed that users’ perceived
privacy risk monotonically increases with data sensitiv-
ity and visibility, and monotonically decreases with data
relevance to the application. Furthermore, how visible
data is in an application by default when the user dis-
closes data had the highest impact on the perceived pri-
vacy risk. This model would enable developers to mea-
sure the users’ perceived privacy risk associated with
data items, which would help them to understand how to
treat different data within a system design.
1. Introduction
The new European General Data Protection Regula-
tions (GDPR) that came into effect in 2018 has gener-
ated considerable interest towards privacy design guide-
lines in software system designers, such as the Privacy
by Design (PbD) principles [1]. However, PbD has been
criticized for its limitations in being incompatible and
different to the usual activities developers perform when
they design software systems [2,3]. One such limitation
that has been frequently raised is its lack of support for
developers to understand users’ perceived privacy risk
when they design software systems [3]. Lack of under-
standing on the privacy risk perceived by users could
result in systems that do not cater for user privacy ex-
pectations and hence invade user privacy when users in-
teract with those systems [4]. That is, users perceive a
privacy risk when they disclose data into software sys-
tems, depending on the system they interact with and
the data they are required to disclose [5]. However,
heretofore developers are oblivion to this privacy risk
users perceive [4, 6, 7]. If a system collects and stores
data users perceive to have a higher privacy risk without
anonymity or encryption, these data could be hacked and
used by other parties, which could result in cyber bully-
ing and identity theft. Because of this, software systems
continue to fail user privacy even with the strict privacy
regulations [1] and numerous privacy guidelines such as
PbD that guide developers to embed privacy into soft-
ware systems [4].
In this research we propose a model that would en-
able software developers to understand the privacy risk
users perceive when they disclose data into software sys-
tems. Previous research has shown that the knowledge
of the properties of data (such as how sensitive the con-
tent is and how visible the content is in a system) could
be used [8] to measure the privacy risk of content in
software systems. Consequently, it has been identified
that this perceived privacy risk can be identified through
the data disclosure decisions made by users [5]. For ex-
ample, how sensitive data is, and how relevant data is
to the application, are known to have an effect on the
data disclosure decisions made by users [5]. This is be-
cause users’ data disclosure decisions are closely related
to their perceived privacy risk [9–11].
Building on this knowledge, we first measure users’
perceived privacy risk through their data disclosure de-
cisions, and model the perceived privacy risk using the
properties of the data such as data sensitivity and vis-
ibility. Then, using a survey with 151 respondents we
observe how good our model fits with the actual privacy
risk perceived by users. Our findings disclosed that visi-
bility of data has a significant impact on the privacy risk
perceived by users. We also observed that the related-
ness of data to the purpose of the application, has a neg-
ative impact on the privacy risk perceived by users when
they interact with systems. With these findings develop-
ers can understand how they need to design systems to
reduce the risk of data items within systems. This would
eventually lead to systems that respect user privacy.
The paper is structured as follows. We first discuss
the background of perceived privacy risk, and privacy
risk measurement to establish the grounds on which our
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work stand. Then, building on the existing theoretical
knowledge on measuring privacy risk, we first logically
build our model to measure users’ perceived privacy risk
associated with disclosing data items in a given software
system setting. Thereafter, we describe the experiment
we conducted to measure the actual privacy risk per-
ceived by users when they disclose their data. Next, we
present our results where we show how good out model
fits the observations, followed by a discussion of the ob-
served variations and limitations of our model. Finally,
we present our conclusions.
2. Background
Our focus in this research is to develop a metric
to measure the users’ perceived privacy risk associated
with data (such as their name, address and email ad-
dress) in software systems (such as their banking app,
their social networking account etc.). It has been iden-
tified that understanding the data disclosure decisions
made by users when interacting with software systems
could help understanding their perceived privacy risk
[9–11]. Nevertheless, among many research studies that
attempts to interpret users privacy risk and their data dis-
closure decisions [5, 10, 12–14], so far no attempt has
been made to measure this privacy risk perceived by
users when they disclose data into systems, in a com-
prehensive way to software developers.
Most research that observe disclosure decisions of
users attempt to identify factors that could increase data
disclosure. For example, focusing on the intrinsic prop-
erties of the data being shared, Bansal et al. have shown
that users’ intention to disclose health information is af-
fected by the sensitivity of the data [15]. This intrigued
our interest. Malhotra et al. have also shown that con-
sumer willingness to share personal data in commercial
platforms is affected by the sensitivity of the data [11].
Similarly, Malheiros et al. [5] have shown that sensitiv-
ity of data items such as date of birth and occupation
had a significant affect on the decisions of the users to
disclose that data into software systems. However, how
these parameters correlate when users make their deci-
sions to disclose data and how software developers could
make use of this information when they design software
systems are not yet known.
Consequently, it is said that users are more likely to
disclose data when they are shown the decisions made
by their friends [14] or other users [16]. Similarly, Ac-
quisti et al. found that changing the order of intru-
siveness of the data being requested also makes users
disclose more data when interacting with software sys-
tems [17]. Furthermore, testing the effect of the jus-
tification provided by the system when requesting data
Knijnenburg and Kobsa [18] revealed that when users
are told this data is useful for you users are more likely
to disclose data to the application. Nevertheless, these
research focus either on the features of the system that
requests data [5, 10, 13] or the personality of the user
who discloses data [19] and attempt to find ways to in-
crease user data disclosure [14]. We approach this prob-
lem from a different standpoint. We believe that rather
than finding ways to increase data disclosure, developers
should implement better privacy in systems and trans-
parently communicate with users so that the cumulative
privacy risk in systems would be reduced. For this de-
velopers should be able to measure and understand the
privacy risk perceived by users when they disclose data.
From a perspective of privacy risk measurement,
Maximilien et al. [8] have shown that a metric for pri-
vacy risk in a given context can be obtained by mul-
tiplying the measurement for sensitivity of a data item
with the measurement for visibility the data item gets
in an application. They define their metric for privacy
risk as “a measurement that determines their [the user’s]
willingness to disclose information associated with this
item” [8]. Using this metric, Minkus and Memon [20]
have attempted to measure the privateness of Facebook
users from their privacy settings. However, privacy risk
is a contextual measurement. The context in which data
is being disclosed [19, 21] is known to have an effect
on user disclosure decisions [5, 12]. For example, it is
said that users have a negative attitude towards rewards
for data disclosure when the requested data appears ir-
relevant for a system [10], whereas they accepted the
rewards if the data is relevant for the system. However,
the current model by Maximilien et al. [8] for privacy
risk measurement of content, does not account for the
relatedness of data. Nevertheless, when a developer at-
tempts to make use of the perceived privacy risk of data
to support him in the decisions to embed privacy into
the system (for example embedding data minimization
into a software system), how relevant the data is to the
system is important [6]. The requirements established
by the recent reforms in the GDPR to collect only rel-
evant data, and communicate the use of data to system
users [1] exacerbates the importance of developers ac-
counting for data relatedness when designing privacy-
respectful software systems.
In this research, we focus on the effect of data sensi-
tivity, the relevance of the data for an application and the
visibility the data gets in the application on the privacy
risk perceived by users. With this we propose a model
that could communicate the effect of data sensitivity,
visibility and the relatedness of data for a particular ap-
plication on the privacy risk perceived by users to soft-
ware developers and privacy researchers. By software
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developers, we refer to all those who are involved in
making the decisions on collecting data, designing and
implementing software systems. The proposed model
would help them to understand and incorporate privacy
risk perceived by users into the software system designs
and assist the development of privacy respectful soft-
ware systems.
3. Study Design
In this section we first introduce the parameters of
data we are interested in. Then using these parameters
we derive and propose a model to measure privacy risk
of data items based on existing theoretical knowledge.
The goal of our research was to develop a measure-
ment to calculate the privacy risk perceived by users
when they disclose data into software systems. Refer-
ring to previous research we identified data sensitivity
(S), relatedness (R) and visibility (V) of data has an im-
pact on the privacy risk that is perceived by users when
they make data disclosure decisions. For the context of
this research we define data sensitivity, visibility and re-
latedness of data to be parameters that depend only on
the data item Di and the application context in which it
is being accessed/usedCj . Following subsections define
the parameters for the context of the model we propose.
3.1. Data Sensitivity
We define the sensitivity of a particular data item to
be a parameter that is dependent on the data item Di
itself. That is credit card number is inherently more sen-
sitive for a user than their age. We define sensitivity of a
data item to be the perceived impact of loss of that par-
ticular data item. We define sensitivity in three categor-
ical values based on logical reasoning and the definition
of sensitive data in the European Data Protection Reg-
ulations (GDPR) [1]. Three categories are considered
to be cognitively more manageable than complex scales
with more levels of categorization [7]. Our definitions
for categorization is given in table 1.
3.2. Data Visibility (V)
We define the visibility of a data element to be an in-
herent property gained by a particular data elementDi in
a particular application context Cj due to the design of
the application. That is how visible the data item would
be by default once the user disclose the data item to the
application. If the application by default allows the data
to be seen only by the user, we define that data item
has the lowest visibility. These categories are defined
on the basis of the survey conducted by Minkus and
Table 1. Data Sensitivity (S)
Category Description S
Category I
- Highest
sensitivity
Data that could be used to identify a
unique characteristic of a person. For
example, a person’s race, religion or
HIV status.
3
Category
II - Mod-
erate
sensitivity
Personally Identifiable information
about the person. For example,
a person’s name, address, mobile
number.
2
Category
III - Low
sensitivity
Any other detail about a person that
may have an impact of loss, however,
would not affect the person. For exam-
ple, a person’s high school.
1
Memon [20]. In their attempts to scale Facebook privacy
settings according to their visibility, they have asked par-
ticipants questions that investigate the users’ perception
of visibility of their content in Facebook. Building on
their reasoning we logically form the three visibility cat-
egories presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Data Visibility
Category Description V
Category I
- Highest
visibility
Data would be seen by any one by de-
fault. Data is visible in the application
by default. For example the name of a
user in Facebook.
3
Category
II - Mod-
erate
visibility
Data would be seen by a controlled set
of users by default. For example, con-
tent that can be only see by the friends
of the user in Facebook.
2
Category
III - Low
visibility
Data would be seen by any one by de-
fault. Data is visible in the application
by default. For example, your pin num-
ber in the banking app will not be visi-
ble to any one.
1
3.3. Data Relatedness (R)
We define the relatedness of a data element Di to
be a property that is defined by the application context
Cj . That is based on the requirements of the applica-
tion, the data could be highly related to the application
(for example, your bank account number for your bank-
ing application) or not related at all. This is determined
by the primary functionality of the application defined
by the application requirements. We build this catego-
rization based on logical reasoning. While it has been
widely accepted that the relatedness of data affects the
privacy risk perceived by users when they disclose data
into software systems [19, 21], so far there is no evi-
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dence as to how related a data item should be in order
to make users feel comfortable sharing those data into
the system. Therefore, based on logical reasoning, we
propose the categorization present in table 3 for scaling
data relatedness to a software system.
Table 3. Data Relatedness
Category Description R
Category I
- Highest
relatedness
Data the application cannot do without.
These data are absolutely necessary for
the primary functionality of the appli-
cation.
3
Category
II - Mod-
erate
relatedness
Data could add additional functionality
to the application. For example, data
that could deliver benefits through data
analysis techniques.
2
Category
III - Low
relatedness
Data the application can do without.
For example, data that is not needed for
the functionality of the application.
1
According to our definitions presented in tables 1-3, the
relatedness of a data element Di in an application con-
text Cj also takes categorical values Ri,j ∈ {1,2,3}, vis-
ibility of a data element Di in an application context Cj
takes categorical values Vi,j ∈ {1,2,3} and the sensitiv-
ity of a data element Di takes categorical values Si ∈
{1,2,3}.
3.4. A Model to calculate privacy risk of data
elements :
In order to model users’ perceived privacy risk, we
define the calculated privacy risk Pi,j of a data element
Di in an application context Cj as follows. Building up
on the relationship proposed by Maximilien et al. [8] we
define that the privacy risk Pi,j of a data element Di in
an application context Cj monotonically increases with
the sensitivity of a data item Si and the visibility of a
data item in a given context V(i,j). This has been previ-
ously used by Minkus and Memon [20] in determining
the privacy level of Facebook privacy settings for a par-
ticular user. Then, we propose that the privacy risk Pc
of a data element Di in an application context Cj is in
a monotonically decremental relationship with the relat-
edness of the data element Di to the application context
Cj . This is based on the knowledge that users perceive
low privacy risk when disclosing data items that are rel-
evant to the application as opposed to data elements that
do not appear relevant [18]. Therefore, we propose that
an approximation for the privacy risk Pi,j of a data el-
ement Di in an application context Cj can be obtained
by,
Privacy Risk P(i,j) =
Sai × V b(i,j)
Rc(i,j)
where a,b and c values could take any real number.
However, as we are aiming for an approximation we
limit a,b,c to whole numbers.
According to this calculation Privacy Risk P(i,j) of a
data element Di in an application context Cj ∈ {x| x in
IR where, 0 < x}. Next, in order to see how closely the
proposed model fit the actual privacy risk perceived by
the users when they disclose data we conducted a survey
study.
4. Research Study
Our goal in conducting the research study is to ob-
serve how close the relationship we proposed using data
sensitivity, visibility and relatedness approximate the ac-
tual privacy risk perceived by users. Building on the
work of Maximilien et al. [8] we define perceived pri-
vacy risk Pi,j to be “a measurement that determines the
user’s feeling of discomfort in disclosing an data item
Di in an application context Cj”. We conducted two
separate user studies for this research.
4.1. Study I :
The first study was an online survey with 151 inter-
net users to obtain the dependent variable of our model,
the privacy risk perceived by users Pi,j . Users’ per-
ceived privacy risk can be interpreted as their discom-
fort or reluctance for data disclosure in software sys-
tems [9–11]. Therefore, in the user survey we obtained
the discomfort of users when they disclose data into soft-
ware systems Fd as a measurement of their perceived
privacy risk Pi,j . For this we defined three data disclo-
sure scenarios.
• Health-care application that allows remote con-
sultancy with doctors - with data being visible to
the user and the doctor.
• Social Networking application - with no control
over data visibility (Cannot control who can view
the data once disclosed).
• Banking application - with the data being visible
only to the user (and the bank).
We defined these scenarios with three different visi-
bility levels based on our definitions in table 2. We used
ten data items including demographic data and sensi-
tive data following the GDPR [1]. The data items we
provided are name, age, address, mobile number, email
Page 6138
address, occupation, blood type, credit card number,
medicine taken, and birthday. We asked the participants
how they would feel if they are to disclose these 10 data
items in the four application contexts. We define a five
point Likert scale to express their feeling of disclosure
Fd, with values, very uncomfortable, somewhat uncom-
fortable, neutral, somewhat comfortable and very com-
fortable. We alternatively used reverse ordered Likert
scales to ensure the validity of the answers. We consider
Fd to be a function of the sensitivity of the data item i
(Si), visibility of the data item in the application j (Vi,j)
and the relatedness of the data item to the context of the
software system j (Ri,j). Our goal is to determine how
close the calculated privacy risk from the model we pro-
posed Pi,j would approximate Fd.
In the survey we also included an open ended ques-
tion in the questionnaire to further observe the reasons
for the difference in the feeling of discomfort (Fd) users
expressed. With this we aimed to obtain further insights
as to why users demonstrate different discomfort levels
when they disclose different data items into different ap-
plication contexts. At the end of the survey, we included
questions to extract the demographics of the participants
which is presented in table 4.
Table 4. Participants (151)
Gender No. of Participants
Male 87
Female 64
Education
Completed School Education 5
Professional Diploma 9
Bachelor’s Degree 87
Masters/PhD 50
Age
18-24 31
25-32 101
33-40 13
41 or above 6
The survey design was evaluated with two partici-
pants (graduate students in the university not connected
to the research). We fine tuned the wording of the ques-
tionnaire with the feedback of these two participants.
Then the survey was distributed using social media plat-
forms (Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter) and personal
connections of the authors. The research methodology
(survey design, participant recruitment and results col-
lection) was approved by the university ethic committee
responsible for ethical conduction of studies that involve
human subjects.
In the invitation email we sent to participants, we in-
cluded a brief introduction about the survey and the du-
ration of the survey (under 10 minutes, calculated using
the participants who evaluated the questionnaire). We
provided the participants with the contact details of the
researchers in case they wanted to contact us for more
information. Before proceeding with the survey partici-
pants were given an introduction to the survey with de-
tails about the survey and the type of data we collect.
We also informed the participants that they could exit
the survey at any time without submitting their answers.
Participants were asked to proceed with the survey if
they give us (the researchers) consent to collect and store
the details they submit with the survey.
We measured the participant adequacy while collect-
ing data and stopped data collection when we reached
sample adequacy at KMO = 0.8 (A KMO value 0.8 is
considered good in calculating correlations [22]). We
had 157 responses at that point. We then analyzed the
data and eliminated 6 responses that were either incom-
plete or invalid as the participant had selected the same
choice in the Likert scale for all options.
To transform the likert scale input into a measure-
ment of the feeling of discomfort of the participants, we
assigned values from 1 to 5 for the answers we received
on the Likert scale as follows. Very Comfortable (1),
Somewhat Comfortable (2), Neutral (3), Somewhat Un-
comfortable (4), Very Uncomfortable (5). Through this
we obtained Fd ∈ {1,2,3,4,5} of users for the 30 sce-
narios (ten data items in three application contexts) that
represent the user’s feeling of discomfort in disclosing
data.
4.2. Study II :
The second study was a focus group with 4 soft-
ware developers, to obtain the independent variables of
the model (sensitivity, visibility and relatedness) for the
three data disclosure scenarios we used in the survey.
As our goal is to introduce a metric for software devel-
opers to evaluate the privacy risk perceived by users, we
calculated P(i,j) through a focus group with 4 partic-
ipants with software development experience. We be-
lieve this approach would closely represent the context
in which software developers would discuss and evalu-
ate the sensitivity, visibility and the relatedness of the
data elements they use in software systems, at design
stage. The focus group took 40 minutes and the partici-
pants were volunteers.
In the focus group we first discussed the data items
as individual elements and categorize them according to
sensitivity. For this we provided the participants with
the three categorical definitions we defined in table 1.
Next, for all three application scenarios, we asked the
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developers to categorize the ten data items according
to their relatedness to the application context and pro-
vided them with table 3. We encouraged the partici-
pants to raise arguments and discuss and clarify differ-
ent opinions in categorizing data. As visibility was pre-
determined when we defined the three application sce-
narios in the survey and communicated to users in the
user study we did not evaluate it here. During the focus
group, we also evaluated our model for data categoriza-
tion presented in Table 1, 2 and 3. We encouraged the
participants to argue and raise any concerns they had on
the three categories we defined and their appropriateness
in categorizing the data. We discuss the concerns raised
by the participants in the focus group when we discuss
our findings.
4.2.1. Data Analysis After obtaining the S,V,R
combinations for the 30 scenarios from the focus group,
we tested the calculated perceived privacy risk using our
model against the perceived privacy risk values we ob-
tained through the user study. We first attempted to fit
our model on the raw data available (151 users and 30 in-
stances, altogether 4530 instances). However, due to the
relatively high variation of data, it was not possible to fit
a model to the data set. That is, the same combination of
S,V, R values had multiple perceived privacy risks vary-
ing from 1 to 5. This is expected because users have
very different perceived privacy risks. We then averaged
the perceived privacy risk of all 151 users to obtain 30
distinct mean perceived privacy risk values for the 30
scenarios tested. Then we used these values to observe
the goodness of fit of our proposed model in Matlab.
We used qualitative methods to analyse the an-
swers to the open ended question using two indepen-
dent coders. We followed the grounded theory approach
where the coders coded data by eliciting codes from the
data available without any prejudice [23]. This was done
in NVivo [24]. Coders reached code saturation at 49 and
103 respectively. The two coders came up with 6 com-
mon codes and 7 and 20 codes present in either of the
coders at the end. This was because one coder had very
granular level codes while the other coder had coded
data at a higher level. For example, one coder had a code
saying visibility of data, while the other coder had three
separate codes for the same content as controlling who
can see my data, application providing tools to hide data
from public and controlling data in the app. Then both
coders iteratively evaluated their codes and merged sim-
ilar codes together to come up with 11 final codes that
explain the differences in the privacy risks perceived by
the participants.
5. Results
Figure 1. Feeling of Discomfort in Disclosure -
Health application
Figure 2. Feeling of Discomfort in Disclosure -
Social Networking application
We tested the validity of our results with Cronbach’s
alpha (0.91) (a Cronbach’s alpha > 0.7 is considered ac-
ceptable [25]) and the participant adequacy for correla-
tions with KMO (KMO = 0.8269). The charts (figures
1-3) shows the averages of the disclosure feeling of the
151 participants on the 10 data items across the three
scenarios. It can be seen that in all scenarios except for
the banking app users had the highest discomfort in shar-
ing their credit card information, and this was followed
by medical information except for the medical applica-
tion, which suggests users feel higher risk when disclos-
ing sensitive data yet, it was reduced when they felt that
the data was related to the application.
Table 5. Model Fitting - basic model
Model a (95% CI) Goodness of fitSSE R2 RMSE
S1i×V 1(i,j)
R1
(i,j)
0.24 67.8 0.6 1.5
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Figure 3. Feeling of Discomfort in Disclosure -
Banking application
Table 6. Model Fitting
Model a (95% CI) Goodness of fitSSE R2 RMSE
a(
S1i×V 1(i,j)
R2
(i,j)
) 0.24 15.22 0.4353 0.7373
a(
S1i×V 1(i,j)
R3
(i,j)
) 0.21 16.7 0.3803 0.7723
a(
S1i×V 2(i,j)
R1
(i,j)
) 0.10 9.335 0.6536 0.5774
a(
S1i×V 2(i,j)
R2
(i,j)
) 0.08 12.57 0.5336 0.67
a(
S1i×V 2(i,j)
R3
(i,j)
) 0.08 14.4 0.4657 0.7171
a(
S1i×V 3(i,j)
R1
(i,j)
) 0.03 8.285 0.6926 0.544
a(
S1i×V 3(i,j)
R2
(i,j)
) 0.03 11.73 0.5646 0.5646
a(
S1i×V 3(i,j)
R3
(i,j)
) 0.02 13.71 0.4912 0.6998
a(
S2i×V 1(i,j)
R1
(i,j)
) 0.08 13.94 0.4828 0.7055
a(
S2i×V 1(i,j)
R2
(i,j)
) 0.07 15.38 0.4294 0.7411
a(
S2i×V 1(i,j)
R3
(i,j)
) 0.07 16.45 0.3895 0.7666
a(
S2i×V 2(i,j)
R1
(i,j)
) 0.03 11.06 0.5897 0.6284
a(
S2i×V 2(i,j)
R3
(i,j)
) 0.02 14.78 0.4515 0.7266
a(
S2i×V 3(i,j)
R1
(i,j)
) 0.01 10.07 0.6264 0.5996
a(
S2i×V 3(i,j)
R2
(i,j)
) 0.009 12.74 0.5271 0.6746
a(
S2i×V 3(i,j)
R3
(i,j)
) 0.009 14.38 0.4665 0.7166
a(
S3i×V 1(i,j)
R1
(i,j)
) 0.02 14.37 0.4669 0.7163
a(
S3i×V 1(i,j)
R2
(i,j)
) 0.02 15.31 0.432 0.7394
a(
S3i×V 1(i,j)
R3
(i,j)
) 0.02 16.22 0.3982 0.7611
a(
S3i×V 2(i,j)
R1
(i,j)
) 0.009 11.68 0.5664 0.646
a(
S3i×V 2(i,j)
R2
(i,j)
) 0.009 13.56 0.497 0.6958
a(
S3i×V 2(i,j)
R3
(i,j)
) 0.008 14.86 0.4485 0.7286
a(
S3i×V 3(i,j)
R1
(i,j)
) 0.003 10.78 0.5998 0.6206
a(
S3i×V 3(i,j)
R2
(i,j)
) 0.003 13.12 0.513 0.6846
Tables 5-7 shows the results when our model for cal-
culated privacy risk P(i,j) was tested against the per-
ceived privacy risk Fd. In these tables SSE : Sum of
Squares due to Error, R2 : Square of the correlation
between the calculated Pi,j and the observed Pi,j , and
RMSE : Root Mean Squared Error. Table 5 shows that
when we give the same power to all three parameters in
the relationship the error is relatively high with a low
R-square value. In table 6, we tried all 27 combinations
of the powers 1,2 and 3 for S,V,R combinations without
the combinations where all parameters have the same
power. That is we ignored the combinations (1,1,1),
(2,2,2) and (3,3,3). Table 6 shows that the goodness of
fit increases with the increase of the power of visibility
and decreases when the power of sensitivity and relat-
edness increases. Therefore, in table 8 we gradually in-
creased the power of visibility and tested the goodness
of fit while keeping the power of sensitivity and related-
ness at 1.
Table 7. Model Fitting - increasing visibility
Model a (95% CI) Goodness of fitSSE R2 RMSE
a(
S1i×V 4(i,j)
R1
(i,j)
) 0.01 7.872 0.7079 0.5302
a(
S1i×V 5(i,j)
R1
(i,j)
) 0.003 7.723 0.7134 0.5252
a(
S1i×V 6(i,j)
R1
(i,j)
) 0.001 7.682 0.7149 0.5238
a(
S1i×V 7(i,j)
R1
(i,j)
) 0.01 7.682 0.715 0.5238
a(
S1i×V 8(i,j)
R1
(i,j)
) 0.01 7.693 0.7145 0.5242
a(
S1i×V 9(i,j)
R1
(i,j)
) 4.378e-05 7.706 0.7141 0.5246
We can see that the error increases again the power
of visibility increases beyond 7. Therefore, the optimal
relationship with the best goodness of fit is in the model
where visibility is raised to the power of 7 with a co-
efficient of 0.01. This had a SSE of 7.6 and an R2 of
71.5%. However the increase ofR2 from the model with
visibility to the power three to visibility to the power 7
is only almost 1%. Therefore, one could safely assume
that the model,
0.03× Si × V 3(i,j)
R(i,j)
gives a good enough approximation of the privacy
risk perceived by users for a data item i in a software
application j. From the results, it is apparent that the
visibility has the largest effect on the perceived privacy
risk. In order to further observe why users felt differ-
ently when they disclosed data in the three scenarios we
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used in the study, we present the qualitative analysis of
the reasons users gave.
5.1. Qualitative Analysis
Table 8 summarizes the codes we generated through
the qualitative analysis. When it comes to the prop-
erties of data, participants mentioned that sensitivity,
relevance and visibility of the data items affected their
disclosure decisions. However, from their answers we
could not identify any other attribute related to the data
itself that affected the privacy risk perceived by users
when they disclosed data. Participants mostly men-
tioned relevance of data (26%) followed by sensitivity of
data (15%) and data visibility (12%). Nevertheless, our
model showed that the visibility of data had the highest
impact on the privacy risk perceived by users. Concern-
ing visibility, participants said If the application pro-
vides some tools to hide private information from pub-
lic, it is fine and the controls on the data we disclosed
are important.
Consequently, we identified that users are concerned
about the trust towards the organization that develop
and publish applications (19%). Participants said that
they are comfortable sharing data as long as the applica-
tion is developed and owned by a trusted organization.
This explains the relatively low mean perceived privacy
risk we observed for the banking app, probably because
users trusted their bank more. When it comes to trust,
some participants spoke about the trust with the appli-
cation itself rather than the organization (11%). Inter-
estingly, participants said that they build trust based on
common sense, Thats due to the feeling of trust I have
with them. i’m aware i should read information disclo-
sure agreement. But I’m not reading it most of the time
and use common sense. This is an interesting finding
that could be investigated further to see how users build
trust with applications without reading the privacy pol-
icy. Some participants also raised concerns about per-
sonal safety (12%). Their concerns on personal safety
was two fold. One, financial and reputation loss when
data is accessed by unknown parties and two, being sub-
jected to unwanted marketing via phone and email. They
said they consider being exposed to unwanted advertis-
ing as a personal threat. A small number of participants
mentioned their personal experience, the news they hear
and also the benefits they could gain through data dis-
closure.
6. Discussion
The model we propose in this research is derived
based on the theoretical knowledge presented by Max-
imilien et al. [8]. They propose that privacy risk could
be measured by sensitivity (S) and visibility (V) where
S and V are in any arbitrary relationship that results in a
monotonically incremental result for privacy risk. How-
ever, their model has been applied on the assumption
that both S and V of content has the same effect on the
privacy risk [20]. Consequently, their model does not
account for the relatedness of content. In our model we
introduced a term for relatedness (R) of the content and
through a user study we were able to identify that V had
more impact on the privacy risk of the content than S
and R. Our model shows that content visibility should
be considered at a higher power to closely approximate
the perceived privacy risk. This suggests that develop-
ers could significantly reduce the privacy risk perceived
by users by controlling the visibility of their data within
the system. That is in a system design, after measur-
ing the privacy risk perceived by users against the data
that is used in the system, developers could reduce the
visibility of data with high privacy risk. When data is
less visible in a system, the risk associated with those
data reduces. This principle is also coined by unobserv-
ability and undetectability. Thereby suggesting that this
would also reduce the actual privacy risk of data items
in the system. Our model also shows that the R of data
is in a monotonically decreasing relationship with users’
perceived privacy. This suggest that developers should
focus on using data that is absolutely necessary (higher
relatedness) for the applications. Data privacy regula-
tions such as the GDPR also emphasize this need [1].
Therefore, though reducing the perceived privacy risk of
data, system developers can also reduce the actual pri-
vacy risk of data within their system designs.
For the categorization of data according to S, V and
R we used three categories. In the workshop to deter-
mine S,V and R values with software developers, we
encouraged the developers to further define categories
if they felt three categories were not sufficient to han-
dle the variations in S, V and R of data. We also asked
them to challenge and argue on the definitions we have
provided. While the participants agreed with three cat-
egories for V and R, they said that S may require more
categories to identify sensitive data and extremely sen-
sitive data. However, when they created one more cate-
gory for extremely sensitive data, they ended up moving
all data in the sensitive category to the extremely sensi-
tive category and hence ending up with three categories
at the end. Therefore, the participants agreed that the
three categories we defined sufficiently captures the S,V
R variation in data.
Our model provides developers with a measurable
approach to understand users’ perceived privacy risk.
While previous research has always highlighted the need
for software developers to understand and acknowledge
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Table 8. Issues participants faced when embedding privacy into the designs
Code Representative Quotes Coverage
Benefit to me how it benefits myself/ how useful it is for me. 2.64% (4)
How much I need the app based on my requirements from the application 7.2%(11)
News I see by considering cyber crimes and all that 0.66%(1)
Personal experience I was in couple of these situations which gave me an idea 2%(3)
Personal Safety Some data could cause reputation and/or financial loss 12% (19)
Relevance of data if I don’t think such applications needs the data 26% (40)
Visibility of Data whether I could control what others see 12% (19)
Sensitivity of Data some sensitive information can’t be disclosed irrespective of the application 15% (23)
Transparency Depends on what they are going to do with the information 6.6% (10)
Trusting the application every online application cannot be trusted 11% (17)
Trusting the organization If it is a reputed or a government institution there is less doubt and more trust 19% (29)
user privacy requirements [3, 6], involvement of actual
users in the system design process is not considered
practical due to higher costs and time constrains [2]. Our
model provides a cost effective alternative for develop-
ers to approximate the privacy risk perceived by users
when they design software systems. Furthermore, com-
pared to the soft measurements developers are expected
to make in most scenarios that involve user privacy, we
argue that this model to measure users’ perceived pri-
vacy risk would be meaningful and pragmatic. For ex-
ample, it has been previously coined that when imple-
menting privacy in software systems, developers find
it difficult to interpret the requirements to anonymize
appropriate data, encrypt sensitive data, when they are
required to make soft decisions which are not measur-
able [4]. The proposed model would help developers
to understand data and the perceived privacy risk asso-
ciated with data [26]. This knowledge could be used
within existing privacy guidelines, to measure the pri-
vacy risk of data. Thereby identifying data considered as
high risk and implement techniques in system designs to
protect data. However, we do not go to the extent of arbi-
trarily proposing ways to use the model proposed here.
Rather, we suggest that privacy engineers and system
developers could utilize the knowledge presented in this
paper to implement and protect user data in system de-
signs, paving the way for designing privacy aware soft-
ware systems.
Consequently, the model we derived here does not
account for the human attributes of users that affect
their perceived privacy risk when interacting with soft-
ware systems. Previous research has shown that the per-
sonality of users affects the privacy risk they perceive
when they interact with software systems. For exam-
ple, Westin’s privacy personality scale [27] shows that
users could be divided into privacy fundamentalists (ex-
tremely concerned about privacy), privacy pragmatists
(believe that privacy needs to be compromised according
to situations) and privacy unconcerned, (little or no con-
cern about privacy) [27]. Indicating the effect of such
personalities, in our survey one participant said Basi-
cally I feel comfortable giving information on a need to
know basis only and another one said nothing implying
he did not feel different disclosing data into different ap-
plication settings. This could be explained by the theory
of psychometry, which explains why people’s percep-
tion of external factors such as privacy is dependent on
their psychological differences [11, 28]. There is a lot
of work done in this area where privacy psychometry
is scaled and defined. For example IUIPC is one such
scale that defines how people differ in their privacy atti-
tudes [11]. These scales suggest that attributes such as
previous experience and the nature of work they do that
may affect users’ perceived privacy risk. For example,
P5 said With the experiences when surfing in the inter-
net made me to answer above questions so and P89 said
I was in couple of these situations which gave me an
idea to answer these questions easily. However, in this
research our focus was to model the perceived privacy
risk eliminating the personality traits of a person. There-
fore, by design our survey did not capture the privacy
profile of our participants. The model we tested had an
SSE value of 7.682 and an R2 value of 71%, which is
an acceptable goodness of fit in a human study. While
the variations in the model could probably be explained
by human factors, for the purpose of deriving a model
for software developers to approximate the privacy risk
users perceive related to the data used in software sys-
tems, our model is appropriate. As future work, we aim
to improve our study with privacy profiling of partici-
pants incorporating the models that capture psychome-
tric measurements [11, 27, 28], in order to observe how
our model could cater for users with different privacy
personalities.
Page 6143
7. Conclusions
In this research we used the sensitivity of data, the
visibility data gets in a system design and the related-
ness of data to the system as the independent variables
and proposed a model to measure users’ perceived pri-
vacy risk based on existing theoretical knowledge. We
then tested our model against the privacy risk perceived
by users in three different application settings. Our re-
sults indicate that both sensitivity and visibility of con-
tent must be in a monotonically increasing combination
to represent the perceived privacy risks. At the same
time relatedness of the content should be in a combina-
tion with sensitivity and visibility such that privacy risk
monotonically decrease with the relatedness. The model
shows that content visibility has the highest impact on
the perceived privacy risk of users.
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